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Abstract 
 This paper attempts to update our awareness of consequences that trust in government 
can have on the American ideological landscape. Collectively, recent influential research by 
Hetherington (2005), Rudolph and Evans (2005), and Rudolph (2009) has shown that low trust in 
government makes people less willing to make material and ideological sacrifices when 
evaluating their support for government programs. This tendency exerts a bottom-up effect on 
the legislative process, tending to, though not exclusively, drown out liberal policymaking. My 
research extends the “Polarization of Trust” argument from Hetherington (2005) and analyzes 
the trust in government and political ideology variables of the Panel Studies from the American 
National Election Studies (ANES) since 1978. At several survey points during the last 30 years, 
Americans’ low trust in government has rarely had a statistically significant, appreciable effect in 
explaining increases in all Americans’ political conservatism, although stronger such effects 
often exist with regard to ideological moderates. Though a discussion of what causes political 
trust and of whether or not trust in government is wholly desirable is absolutely necessary, it is 
by and large outside the purview of this material. This paper’s findings suggest that the recent 
political gains from any recent erosion in trust in government have been small and ambiguous, 




















Why Trust Really Matters: The Changing Ideological Connotations of Trust in 
Government 
 
 President Barack Obama entered the White House following a momentous victory over 
Republican Senator John McCain in the 2008 election. With a substantial majority in the House 
of Representatives and a soon-to-be (though temporary) filibuster-proof majority in the Senate, 
the Democratic Party was at its most influential position in over four decades. Seen in isolation, 
this setting appeared ripe for sweeping enactment of Democratic Party policy agendas. The 
Republican Party brand had seemingly been rejected, and the Democrats had just won two 
consecutively decisive election seasons. Furthermore, during the later years of the Bush 
administration and the immediate aftermath of the Great Recession of 2008, Americans were, in 
the abstract, indicating greater preference for new government interventions like health care 
reform (“Kaiser Health Tracking Poll”). One could even have argued that support for this policy 
was embodied in President Obama’s winning electoral coalition.  
 Yet, within the first 18 months of Barack Obama’s Presidency, the Democratic Party 
would encounter passionate, substantial, and nearly terminal resistance on this bedrock Party 
initiative. Even with the seemingly opposition-proof majorities in the 111
th
 Congress, Democrats 
were barely able to get the Affordable Care Act through the House and had to make multiple 
concessions, among which was the elimination of a single-payer public option, to get the bill 
through the Senate. A government stimulus bill and financial regulatory reform package met 
equally stiff resistance, and a cap-and-trade climate change energy bill never made progress in 
the Senate. Furthermore, it was the Party’s attempts on these issues that were in part credited for 
the Tea Party’s ascendance and the 2010 midterm election’s resurrection of Republican Party 
influence. In short, Democrats ran into far greater resistance in health care reform and other 
policy initiatives than might have been predicted by their legislative majorities and the electoral 
mood of the country.  
 In evaluating explanations of this phenomenon, I argue that a generalized distrust in 
government can explain not only why the Democrats temporarily assumed political power in the 
2006 and 2008 elections, but also, more importantly, why Democrats were often thwarted in 
their platforms despite their (briefly) insurmountable majorities. Though overwhelmingly 
electing Democrats might be associated with supporting policies with more government 
intervention, Americans’ trust in government was at historic lows in 2009, the first year of the 
Obama Presidency (“Pew Research Center”). That this year was to be the year of health care 
reform, cap-and-trade legislation, and government stimulus aggravated Americans’ already-
simmering dissatisfaction with the federal government. In retrospect, the Tea Party movement 
and the generally rapid decline of the Democratic Party’s popularity seem straightforward; the 
Democratic Party was seen as supporting historic interventions of the federal government in 
Americans’ everyday lives at a time when Americans’ belief that the federal government does 
“the right thing” was at historic lows.  
 In this paper, I argue that, beneath the complexities and vagaries of Party politics, the 
recently low levels of trust in the federal government have been creating a more conservative 
American polity that increasingly rejects “Big-Government” policy approaches. Some candidates 
might run better campaigns than others in a given election year, and one Party may be better 
staffed or funded than another, but over time and across Parties, the content of the federal 
government’s policymaking has become more conservative as Americans’ conservatism and 
distrust of the federal government have increased. Importantly, terms like conservative and 
liberal are used throughout this paper and the ANES data to refer to one’s desired size of 
government (conservative being smaller, liberal being larger), though there clearly are other 
connotations of a word like conservative, which will be explored in some of the later data sets. 
Notable scholars have found that liberal social policy options are increasingly forgone by 
Congressmen due to the perception that they are out of touch with the voters (Hetherington 
2005) (Rudolph and Evans 2005). While these authors and many others argue that trust has 
limited, idiosyncratic effects on the political system, I argue that consistent declines in trust in 
government over the last few decades have systematically contributed to the rise in conservatism 
that we’ve seen since the Reagan Revolution.  
 Trust in government is a concept inextricably intertwined with democracy. Government 
institutions that can engender a sense of trust and confidence in the citizenry can help to create 
the conditions for social prosperity. On the other hand, democracy thrives on a questioning, 
skeptical public that doesn’t just give its trust away to charismatic orators and ideologues 
(Hardin 1999). Regular elections themselves are a reflection of this tension between democracy 
and trust; trust is extended to elected representatives, but this trust is temporary and is freely 
revoked the next Election Day. On a broader level, the tension even exists with voting in general; 
that slim majorities regularly vote in Presidential and Congressional elections suggests that 
Americans’ trust in the political system is not a given. Any description of political trust or 
distrust must also consider the interpersonal, civic interactions that take place every day in 
bowling alleys across the country (Putnam 2000).  
 Over the years, the academic study of political trust has focused a great deal on the 
significance and causes of political trust, but until recently little attention had been paid to the 
consequences of changes in political trust, specifically trust in government. Marc Hetherington, 
Thomas Rudolph, and Jilian Evans, whose work shall be described in greater detail later, argued 
persuasively that trust in government has policy ramifications when the policy in question 
implies material or ideological sacrifice; when trust in government is low, those most skeptical 
of a government policy are least likely to afford it greater policymaking authority (Hetherington, 
2005) (Rudolph and Evans, 2005). While straightforward in principle, this dynamic has 
contributed significantly to the decline in policy liberalism. In other words, the decline in trust in 
government among the public has made elected representatives in D.C. less likely to pursue Big 
Government policies.  
 Apart from affecting the moods of conservatives and liberals toward policies, does trust 
in government actually affect the ideology of the American public? If a citizen regularly watches 
television programs that document government waste, or if he or she is regularly dissatisfied 
with the policy outputs of the federal government, or if a series of scandals involving 
Congressmen breaks out, does the citizen become more conservative? It seems intuitive that one 
who becomes distrustful of the federal government would come to describe themselves as more 
ideologically opposed to the federal government’s involvement in Americans’ daily lives. Yet, 
this direct question has received scant attention in the literature. If anything, the research 
assumption has been that one’s ideological description determines one’s level of trust in 
government, but does it seem plausible that a person would become ideological about 
government before trustful or distrustful of government? Using the results of the American 
National Elections Studies (ANES) over the last 30 years, this paper explores the ideological 
polarization of political trust with the thesis that low levels of trust in government will exert a 
direct, noticeable effect on the rise of American conservatism. In the following sections, I will 
lay out a theoretical conceptualization of trust in government; I will then briefly clarify how I 
predict trust in government to influence political ideology. After describing the variables and 
statistical procedures used in my model of political ideology, I will present the results and some 
modest conclusions, based on the limited data.     
 
Trust in the Literature  
 Academically, feelings toward the Trust-Ideology connection have ranged from skeptical 
to apathetic to neglectful. Beyond the droves of research conducted on the causes of trust in 
government and trust in other people, I consider here the research that at least explores the 
concept of trust in government having political consequences.  
 The most obvious place to start is with the question: What is trust? This question has 
been integral to much scholarly work in political economics, public administration, and political 
theory. One dominant framework revolves around the idea that trust is a type of good that person 
A is willing to vest in person B under the assumption that person B will further person A’s 
interests (Levi 1998, page 78; Hardin 1998, 2002). This investment can be made because person 
A truly believes that person B has trustworthy attributes. These interests can be confined to 
person A, or they can extend to a broader circle of people. The investment can also be made 
simply if person A thinks person B has powerful personal interests in continuing the relationship 
(Pettit 1995; Hardin 1998). This dichotomy speaks to the distinction between “thin” and “thick” 
trust. Thin trust characterizes relations between the trust-er and the “generalized other,” someone 
or a group of people with whom the trust-er is not significantly familiar. Thick trust, however, 
refers to trust relations in which the trust-er and the trustee are closely related and familiar with 
each other’s ethical characteristics, for instance (Putnam 2000, pages 136-137). Deliberative 
Democracy theorists such as Robert Putnam and David Miller argue that interaction and 
communication between agents in the trust relationship can give the subsequent trust a thicker 
quality (Putnam 1993; Putnam 1995; Miller 1993). Whether government can and would want to 
engender thin or thick trust is a subject to which I will return later.  
 When dealing with thin trust, the principal form studied in this paper, the decision to 
invest trust can be thought of in cost-benefit terms. If person A has reason enough to think that 
person B will dependably further the former’s interests, then the benefits may be high enough to 
justify the investment of trust. If the prospects for person B’s utility to person A are low, then the 
costs (being vulnerable to being cheated, for instance) might be too high for trust to be invested. 
A couple of layers removed from individual-level trust, citizens may trust government if they 
have enough reason to believe that government will further their interests or the interests of 
society at large, such as securing national borders, providing for the common good, or promoting 
personal liberty. An expression of distrust in government could come overtly in the case of tax 
evasion (Scholz and Lubell 1998) or, more tangentially, in the form of withdrawing support for 
salient government policy interventions. 
 From this point, the first significant divide in the literature comes on the issue of how 
trust in government is derived/what it reflects. David Easton’s classic work categorized the study 
of trust in government into relationships with 1) specific support for political actors and 2) 
diffuse support for political institutions and types of governance (Easton 1965). Whichever one 
of these characteristics one adopts has significant implications for academic study in the area. If 
trust in government is merely a product of satisfaction with specific politicians, it may be a less 
concrete and valid measure of political attitudes than if it reflected contentment with things like 
the military, the welfare state, or environmental regulatory agencies, for instance. With some 
modifications, this basic divide has marked the last five decades of research on trust in 
government. By sorting through this divide, I can better understand the basis for predicting trust 
in government’s effects on changing political ideology.    
 On one side, critics argue that trust in government is an inconsistent, ephemeral, and even 
impracticable concept. Jack Citrin laid the foundations for this line of reasoning in a 1974 paper 
that attempted to make sense of what was then a very recent, precipitous decline in trust in 
government. In surveying “political cynics” from the 1964-1972 American National Elections 
Studies (ANES), Citrin finds that dissatisfaction with incumbents and a greater social acceptance 
of political cynicism led to a greater expression of distrust of government (Citrin 1974). 
Anderson and LoTempio provide a more modern version of this argument by suggesting that 
supporters of the losing Presidential candidate are far more likely to distrust the government in 
the aftermath of an election than are the winners of that election, regardless of which parties win 
and lose the election (Anderson and LoTempio 2002). In this light, trust in government is a very 
transitory, superficial concept that mostly just reflects a person’s competitive standing in the 
political environment. Russell Hardin goes even farther, though, and suggests that there can be 
no genuine facilitator of trust in government because no genuine trust in government can exist 
(Hardin 1999). Here Hardin is mainly referring to specific political candidates, but his argument 
can also be applied to diffuse trust in institutions. In essence, accurate information on 
government’s trustworthiness is too sparse for citizens to be able to make real cost-benefit 
valuations of trusting government; the political actors are too removed, and the machinations of 
the political process are too hidden. Thus, it simply is impossible for a “thick” trust in 
government to be engendered, and therefore anyone who does trust government is projecting 
some other kind of value (Hardin 1999).  
 Proponents of a regime-based or diffuse model of trust in government argue that the 
above authors sell the concept of trust in government short. First, Scholz and Lubell argue that a 
trust “heuristic” can establish a layer of Putnam’s “thin” trust to help citizens make sense of 
Hardin’s complex political world. A history of positive experiences with local leaders, 
communities, and even government agencies can give people an inductive reason to trust these 
social institutions. Trust in government, then, can be thought of as a summary measure of 
political experiences (Scholz and Lubbell 1998, p. 401; Scholz and Pinney 1995). Furthermore, 
Citrin’s measures of institutional dissatisfaction deal with whether or not citizens want to change 
the fundamental form of American government. One could foresee more nuanced incarnations of 
institutional dissatisfaction, like the ones Marc Hetherington used in 1998 to find that 
dissatisfaction with domestic policy, perceived removal from government, and perceived 
ineffectiveness of government all played significant roles in determining one’s generalized 
distrust of government (Hetherington 1998; See also Christensen and Laegreid 2005 for an 
international example). Regarding Anderson and LoTempio (2002), it is likely that relying on the 
victory or loss of two Presidential elections (1972 and 1996) is an overly simplistic view of how 
trust in government is cultivated. Even more than Presidential election outcomes, Anderson and 
LoTempio’s models show that “Pre-Election Trust” (p. 342) is the most significant predictor of 
post-election trust, which begs the question: What types of things build pre-election trust? 
Among others, Carmines and Stimson (1989) offer the idea that issue saliency, in this case the 
Democratic Party’s apparent pursuance of minority-centric causes, can better help to explain 
variation in trust in government among white voters. Independent of electoral outcomes, whether 
foreign policy issues or domestic policy issues dominate the agenda can have significant effects 
on who (ideologically) distrusts government and how many people distrust government 
(Hetherington and Husser 2011). In short, Miller’s (1974) assertion of regime-based origins of 
trust in government still seems plausible in spite of the claims of skeptics that trust in 
government is a fleeting, intangible, or electorally-defined measure.  
     What can explain these opposing conclusions on how trust in government is 
developed? Firstly, modern researchers have the benefit of American National Elections Studies 
(ANES) measures that more accurately tap into the distinctions between regime-based trust and 
incumbent-based trust (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990). Relative effects of satisfaction with 
institutions on trust in government can more easily be teased out by the greater number of battery 
question offered in recent ANES surveys, whereas researchers like Citrin had to rely on 
measurements of general dissatisfaction with American democracy. Secondly, it could be that the 
catalysts for distrust are more programmatic and policy-oriented now than they were in the days 
of Watergate and the Vietnam War, which may have been rightly seen as more cultural cues. 
Either way, when someone answers that they can trust the government to do what is right “Only 
some of the time,” we now have valid reason to assume that there is a significant institutional 
component in the response. 
 The next and most pressing phase of my theoretical argument concerns the implications 
of trust or distrust in government. As has been noted, while there have been decades of research 
devoted to the causes of trust in government, there have also been significant strides in our 
understanding of what trust in government means for our society and for our government. The 
divides from earlier still emerge. Some think that because trust in government is a flimsy 
concept, it has few direct consequences for our political process, while many others believe that, 
since trust in government has generalized policy origins, it has very significant effects on how 
Americans perceive political issues, what policies they’re willing to support, and who they’re 
willing to elect to enact those policies.  
 Citrin (1974) and Anderson and LoTempio (2002) best symbolize the first half of this 
debate. For all of these authors, because distrust of government largely rests on dissatisfaction 
with incumbents (in Congress and the White House, respectively), distrust of government for any 
group of people will only last until the next election. Furthermore, Citrin also found that those 
who distrusted government showed no disinclination to vote, protest, or generally participate in 
civic activities. In fact, it could be that distrust in government has positive implications for 
democratic awareness and that it is a fundamentally American state of mind. While it is 
important to consider these concerns, I would argue that, to the extent that the assumptions of 
this camp were challenged earlier, their dismissal of trust in government’s political implications 
should be viewed very skeptically. The empirical history of the ANES, as suggested above, 
favors a more generalized, institutional view of trust in government, and it is the consequences of 
this type of trust in government that I explore next.    
 For people who see generalized institutions as facilitators of trust or distrust in 
government, there is a wide variety of potential implications for such trust. At a very basic level, 
trust in law enforcement and the impartiality of government administration can act as a kind of 
discount on the costs involved in investing interpersonal trust (Fukuyama 1995) (Levi 1998) 
(Offe 1999). This interpersonal trust, then, can be the foundation upon which civically-active, 
efficient, and productive societies are built. As Robert Putnam argues, societies that prosper and 
adapt to changing conditions are societies that have interpersonal trust and, therefore, active 
citizen participation in the political process (Putnam 1993) (Putnam 1995). Thus, a certain level 
of generalized trust in government can indirectly facilitate civic participation, under this 
framework, though short-term, incumbent-based dissatisfaction may actually promote 
participation, as Citrin (1974) argues. Additionally, government services that have genuine value 
to people may be more effectively consumed when citizen trust in government is higher. Mark 
Warren uses the EPA Superfund program as a case study of a government service that, when 
delivered with greater transparency and efficiency, engendered more trust from citizens and in 
turn provided greater utility to those citizens as they began to take more action to redress their 
neighborhood pollution problems (Warren 1999). In other words, a distrust-worthy institution 
may cause citizens to miss out on the legitimate services that that institution provides. Finally, a 
systematic distrust of institutions like the legislature may lead to sub-optimal legislative 
outcomes. In addressing a problem, legislators may not want to engage in a drawn-out legislative 
process in front of an already-cynical public. Instead, they may search for flawed “Quick-fixes” 
to complex problems because they are more politically palatable (Orren 1997, p. 79).  
 What draws the interest of this paper, however, is the possible connection that trust in 
government may have with the political ideology of the American public. As can be seen, this 
component of trust in government has been voided by the scholarly literature, though there has 
been a recent resurgence of trust-ideology research. Carmines and Stimson (1989) flirted with 
the concept by acknowledging a connection between the salient political issues of the day and a 
person’s trust in government, but issues of racial redistributive policy were treated as the 
independent variables, with trust in government and Party loyalty treated as dependent variables. 
Wouldn’t it be sensible that trust in government might have a return effect on people’s policy 
views? Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn (2000) suggest that, when the population’s trust in 
government is lower, the “Policy mood” of the country shifts to the Right on the political 
spectrum, and when trust is higher, the country’s policy mood shifts to the Left. These policy 
moods are carefully distinguished from programmatic political ideology in that they may be 
limited to specific issues, however. Marc Hetherington wrote what is arguably the linchpin of 
this branch of theory with his 2005 book Why Trust Matters. The overwhelmingly-supported 
thesis of the book says that declining trust in government did shift the policy moods of the 
country, which in turn has prevented Congress from considering many liberal policy options. 
Harkening back to my original discussion of investing trust, Hetherington’s argument states that 
when trust in government decreases, many people are less likely to endorse redistributive 
spending programs (Medicaid, for instance) because these programs may involve a greater 
material cost to the average citizen. These material costs require a higher level of trust in 
government to justify supporting the programs, and when trust in government decreases, 
redistributive policy proposals flounder (Hetherington 2005).  
  Is this dynamic, so central to Hetherington’s argument, limited to material costs and 
redistributive programs? Rudolph and Evans (2005) argue that federal spending of almost any 
kind imposes an ideological cost, in addition to material costs, on conservatives. Conservatives, 
then, will require a higher trust in government than will liberals in order to support 
environmental conservation spending, for instance (Rudolph and Evans 2005). Movements in 
support of federal policies, consequently, may just be reflective of changing trust in government 
among conservatives. Another way of wording this argument is to say that higher levels of trust 
in government can lead to ideological compromise, and this dynamic should not be limited to 
conservatives. It was relatively high trust in government among liberals in 2001 that was said to 
allow them to make the ideological sacrifice of supporting then-President George W. Bush’s tax 
cut proposal (Rudolph 2009). If one reconsiders Anderson and LoTempio’s claim about the 
electoral effects on trust in government, however, this line of reasoning becomes less tenable. It 
seems reasonable, for instance, that conservatives’ trust in government may have increased 
somewhat following the election of Ronald Reagan to the Presidency in 1980. Given the boon 
that the 1980 election was for conservatives, though, it seems very unlikely that conservatives 
would have become more supportive of increased food stamp spending or environmental 
regulations. In other words, ideological groups may only be more open to ideological 
compromise when, politically, it is least likely. This would render the 2001 Bush tax cut episode 
as an aberration, and it would question the thesis that trust in government acts to moderate 
ideology.  
 All of this literature leaves open an important question that I hope to address. Instead of 
asking how liberals and conservatives fluctuate on policy proposals given their changing trust in 
government, we should be asking whether or not changing levels of trust in government act to 
create more conservatives or liberals. If a person becomes less trustful of the government, will 
he or she, in addition to becoming less supportive of the dominant redistributive policy proposal 
of the day, consider himself or herself more conservative? This paper’s working thesis is that 
recent declines in trust in government have exerted an independent effect on the number of self-
declared conservatives and that this conservatism would surely extend to the salient policy issues 
of the day (Hetherington and Husser 2011) (Carmines and Stimson 1989) and would operate 
independently of Party electoral outcomes (Anderson and LoTempio 2002). 
  
 
 Trust in the Theory 
 At the risk of having lost the trust of the reader, I will now attempt to lay out a concise 
theoretical map of how I figure trust in government affects the political process. Let’s start with 
Citizen A, a moderate yet frequent voter who pays reasonably good attention to the world of 
politics. Citizen A reads numerous news stories that document billions of dollars of waste in the 
federal bureaucracy. Delinquent government regulators are said to be bought off by the 
companies they supposedly regulate. A federal education accountability bill, for example, is 
shown to produce unintended negative consequences for student proficiencies in important 
subjects. Meanwhile, congressmen are siphoning taxpayer money off to pork projects that may 
benefit a handful of companies and contractors, and Parties routinely govern in a polarized 
fashion. After months of reports on this erosion of responsible politics on the part of incumbent 
representatives and institutions, Citizen A begins to lose trust in the federal government acting 
ethically or on behalf of his or her interests.  
 When Citizen A loses a generalized trust in government, he or she may become less 
active in civic organizations and may be less willing to utilize government resources like public 
transportation or the Post Office. More important to this paper, though, he or she should begin to 
retract support for interventionist government policies in education, the sample salient policy 
mentioned above. Additionally, Citizen A should also begin to think of themselves as more 
conservative – more supportive of smaller government generally. This increased conservatism 
could have any number of subsequent effects. Citizen A might vote more regularly for 
Republican or Third-Party conservative candidates. Citizen A might vote against or voice 
opposition to measures that would increase the welfare state because he or she doesn’t trust the 
government to redistribute wealth. Most importantly, though, due to being a conservative, 
Citizen A will require a higher level of trust in the future to support such interventionist policies, 
which follows the logic that Hetherington (2005) and Rudolph and Evans (2005) used to argue 
that changes in trust will have the greatest effects on policy preferences among conservatives. 
This new required level of trust should be higher than the trust Citizen A would have required to 
support government interventions when he or she was a moderate. Thus, not only does a 
systemic increase in distrust of the government reduce temporary support for specific policies, it 
may make support for those policies even less likely in the future due to an increased affiliation 
with small-government ideology. In fairness, Citizen A might become more opposed to 
government military intervention in Iraq, if foreign policy issues are salient at the time of eroding 
trust, and many pundits would term this an increase in liberalism. A palatable summary of this 
contradiction is to say that Citizen A should become more ideologically opposed to government 
involvement in salient issue areas as a result of low trust. Whether or not a person’s trust in 
government affects his or her ideology in this manner is what is examined in the following 








 The vehicle for analyzing Americans’ views toward government over time was the Panel 
Studies from the American National Elections Studies (ANES). Other national surveys, such as 
the General Social Survey, probe attitudes such as trust in government and civic trust, but the 
consistency of wording and methodology as well as the timing of the ANES make it an attractive 
time-series case study. The fact that, in any given election season, the Panel Studies interviewed 
the same population multiple times over a period of a couple of years is also a convenient way to 
notice direct shifts in ideology or trust in government. The same group of people would receive 
the same questions on trust, ideology, and other key variables multiple times before, during, and 
after midterm and Presidential elections.  
 Considering that Hetherington’s seminal work (2005) concerned itself mostly with the 
ANES through 2000, I chose to target my analysis on the similarly-designed Panel Studies that 
have taken place since 2000. Namely, these are the 2000-2002 ANES and the 2008-2010 ANES. 
The most significant results come from these surveys, especially the 2008-2010 series. I do, 
however, go back to the 1978-1980 and 1990-1992 Panels to test the relationships I find in the 
more recent studies. This was done to see if the thrust of the effect of political trust on ideology 
has changed drastically since the Reagan Revolution and the generally agreed-upon beginning of 
the Party polarization era. I keep the analyses of these survey periods separate from each other 
for theoretical reasons. During a couple of the survey periods (1990-1992; 2000-2002), foreign 
policy issues were most salient to voters, so the theoretical predictions are quite distinct from the 
other datasets in that low levels of trust in government should encourage “liberal” evolution not 
only on these issues but perhaps in broader ideology. Thus, I evaluate such hypotheses separately 
for each election survey period.  
 As the reader will recall, my hypothesis is that lower levels of trust in government will at 
least partially account for conservative changes in political ideology. Those with lower levels of 
trust at time 1 should, accounting for all other explanatory variables, become more conservative. 
This is easily testable using the ANES’s panel data, which involved repeated interviews of the 
same respondents during two-to-four year election intervals. For my study, four separate election 
periods were most readily available, as mentioned previously: 1978-1980, 1990-1992, 2000-
2002, and 2008-2009 with a most recent re-contact survey wave in 2010. For the different survey 
waves in each election period, instead of simply correlating Trust at time 1 with Ideology at time 
2, I wish to explore whether or not the Trust at time 1 can account for the change in Ideology 
between times 1 and 2. Thus, I create a dependent variable, “Change in Ideology,” that 
represents a subtraction of Ideology at time 1 from Ideology at time 2 (or 3 for more extended 
election periods). If a respondent scored themselves as a 3 (Slightly Liberal) in time 1 and a 5 
(Slightly Conservative) in time 2, then their “Change in Ideology” value would be +2. The 
subtraction is done this way because, as higher scores of Ideology indicated conservatism, a 
positive value for the “Change in Ideology” variable would represent an increase in 
conservatism, and positive relationships between Trust at time 1 and Change in Ideology would 
thus indicate a relationship between higher distrust and higher conservatism. Note that higher 
values of Trust in the ANES coding actually indicate higher distrust of government Finally, I use 
the lagged Ideology variable as an independent variable for “Change in Ideology,” a common 
practice for attitudinal models. The idea addressed with this variable is whether or not a prior 
ideological orientation by itself predisposes a respondent toward one type of ideological change 
or another.  
 To be clear, it is not this paper’s thesis that trust in government is the only or even the 
most important predictor of ideological change; several others must be included in any attempt to 
categorically predict political ideology. While there could arguably be more independent 
variables added to determine political ideology, the ones I study are: Trust in Government, 
Interpersonal Trust, Education level, Income, Interest in public affairs, Awareness of public 
affairs, prior Ideology (within the same election period), prior political Party identification, sense 
of political efficacy, and dummy variables (0 for “No,” 1 for “Yes”) for male gender and racial 
categories. To explain, it could be that declining trust in everyday people around the respondent 
could cause the respondent to desire less interference from society or government in their daily 
life. In this sense, the relationship between interpersonal trust and conservatism may take on a 
similar role to that of trust in government and conservatism. The degree to which a person pays 
attention to politics, is interested in political affairs, or has a sense that the government can 
respond to their grievances may also influence political ideology. Together, these ANES 
questions closely resemble notions of “political sophistication” that previously have been shown 
to be important predictors of political ideology (Feldman and Johnston 2009) Demographic 
variables like education level, income level, gender, and race/ethnicity could all provide their 
own unique ideological cues for respondents, so their inclusion seems justified to avoid creating 
biased results for the Trust estimator. Finally, it also seems that one’s prior or longstanding Party 
and ideological identifications would give respondents a prism through which to view their trust 
or distrust in government. Would someone who is already conservative tend to become more 
conservative if their trust declines than someone who is already liberal? Would the same occur 
when comparing already-declared Republicans versus already-declared Democrats? This is 
certainly a vital question in the aforementioned prior literature and should be included to interact 
with this paper’s models.  
 Some important caveats about the availability of these variables should be noted. First, 
the Awareness variable, operationalized in terms of how much information about public affairs 
the respondent felt he/she had, was only available on the 1978-1980 and 1990-1992 election 
periods. For the other two election periods, a question relating to the respondent’s level of 
interest, coded as “Interest,” was instead included in the models. The degree of trust a respondent 
had in other people, coded as “Social Trust,” was available only in the 1990-1992 and 2000-2002 
data sets. Demographic variable availability was naturally quite stable throughout the election 
periods, though the Hispanic category emerged in later datasets under the race/ethnicity variable. 
Finally, for ambiguity reasons detailed later, a variable measuring the respondent’s level of 
efficacy (In this case a feeling that government officials “cared”) was included in the 2008-2010 
models.  
 Knowledge of how the key ANES variables were coded is vital to understanding the 
significance of any statistical relationships. “Trust” refers to questions that asked the respondents 
how often they trusted the government to do what was right, while “Social Trust” corresponds 
with what many have described as interpersonal trust – how often does the respondent trust other 
people? The “Trust,” “Social Trust,” “Awareness,” and “Interest” variables were all coded from 
1-7 in declining order of trust, awareness, and interest, respectively. Therefore, if something had 
a positive relationship with a “Trust” variable, it was related to a lack of trust. Similarly, as 
coded values for political awareness or interest increase, awareness and interest substantively 
decrease. Demographic variables like levels of education and income were more intuitively 
coded, with higher values relating to higher levels. Dummy, or dichotomous, variables were 
constructed for specific categories of gender and race, with 1 indicating “Male” in the Male 
gender variable and 1 indicating “African American” for the African American race variable, as 
examples. In terms of ideology and Party affiliations, values went from 1-7, drifting from liberal 
to conservative and Democrat to Republican, respectively, along the scales. In later analyses, 
values 3-5 on the Ideology scale were considered separately as a “Moderate” category of 
Ideology. These values corresponded to Slightly Liberal, Middle of the Road, and Slightly 
Conservative, respectively. Parallel considerations could be made for Party identifications.  
Consequently, the Change in Ideology variables took on a -6 to 6 scale, since a respondent could 
go from Extremely Conservative to Extremely Liberal (7 to 1), vice versa, experience less severe 
changes, or experience no change at all (0). In sum, and to aid the reader’s comprehension of 
future tables, a positive relationship between Trust, the key explanatory variable for study, and 
Change in Ideology meant that the more distrustful of government one was, accounting for other 
explanatory variables, the more conservative one was.  
 Arguably the most politically significant shifts in ideology occur at the nation’s political 
center. How the centrists, whether considered as independents or moderates, move in a given 
election can determine the outcome and can influence which policies are considered 
subsequently by politicians. Thus, when I examine Trust’s effect on Change in Ideology, I 
additionally explore this relationship when limited to ideological moderates – those classified 
into 3, 4, and 5 on the ANES Ideology scale. As noted earlier, these values correspond to 
Slightly (Weak) Liberal, Middle of the Road, and Slightly (Weak) Conservative, respectively. 
This more fine-tuned aspect of analysis may differ from the overall Change in Ideology results in 
a couple of respects. Firstly, it is likely the case that extremists on both sides of the ideological 
spectrum are not likely to change their ideological viewpoints in the face of changing attitudes 
like trust in government. Thus, these intransigent respondents may cloud the picture when 
interpreting the electorate’s ideological change over an election period. Studying moderates 
gives us a more dynamic picture of ideological change. Secondly, these moderates may be more 
pliable and susceptible to ideological change through some of the other considered variables like 
“Interest in Politics,” or “Awareness of Public Affairs.” Because social institutions like the 
media may have a greater effect on these respondents during elections, it could be that the more 
dynamic and interesting changes in Ideology as a result of Trust and other variables occur with 
these respondents. The one statistical drawback of this additional analysis is of course the effect 
of dramatically reducing sample sizes from the initial survey, though each of these additional 
models was still statistically significant on the whole.   
 As discussed in the theoretical sections of the paper, I also want to study political trust’s 
effects on specific, salient issue positions during each election period, not just a respondent’s 
general ideological identification. This phase of analysis represents a more recent, updated test of 
the research done by Hetherington (2005) and Rudolph and Evans (2005). Thankfully, the Roper 
Center for Public Opinion Archives at the University of Connecticut offers detailed, repeated 
surveys of what most Americans thought the most important issues of each election period were 
(“Roper Center Public Opinion Archives”). In the 1978-1980 period, for instance, inflation 
unsurprisingly emerged as the most important issue to voters. At the risk of embarking upon a 
too-exhaustive experiment, I included only one or two of these “Most Important Issues” for each 
election period. If a decrease in trust in government promoted conservatism, it should certainly 
do so with regard to these salient issues, even if the relationship were less convincing with regard 
to overall political ideology. 
 Since both the Ideology and Change in Ideology variables have an ordered but limited 
number of outcome categories, the traditional multiple OLS regression model would have 
painted an inadequate picture of these outcome variables. Ordered probit regressions, by which 
each category along the continuum of the outcome variables is considered separately, instead 
were the main mode of statistical analysis. While the coefficients generated from these 
regressions don’t lend themselves to easy substantive interpretation, the key conclusions that can 
be gleaned from regression output with these models are the sign (+ or -) of the coefficient and 
whether or not the result for each independent variable is statistically significant – whether or not 
each coefficient can be explained away by the null hypothesis that no relationship between the 
independent variable and Ideology exists. To fully examine marginal effects, one needs to 
consider the predicted probabilities for each value of the dependent variable (Change in 
Ideology) with respect to changes in the independent variables While Stata, the statistical 
software used in this project, reports statistical significance using a two-tailed test, often I point 
out the one-tailed significance test results for the reader. Nearly all of the specific issue variables 
also had ordinal characteristics and so received this same type of regression analysis. In the 
2008-2010 survey, though, a question on whether or not the respondent approved of President 
Obama’s healthcare policies was a dichotomous (0 or 1) variable, so a logistic regression was run 
to see if a standard deviation increase in each independent variable resulted in a higher or lower 
probability of disapproving of Obama (1) on the issue of healthcare.  
 In the following sections, graphical and substantive results from each survey are reported 
consecutively. A cruder summary table of Trust’s relationship with Ideology across all models is 
also presented. The Results section begins with the 1978-1980 data and works chronologically 
up to the 2008-2010 data. For each election period, results are shown featuring both the Trust-
Change in Ideology models (Including those just for moderates) and the models analyzing Trust 
and specific, salient issues from each election cycle. While I attempt to abstract from the 
statistical results during the discussion of each election cycle, a more generalized summation of 
the results is what concludes the paper.   
 
Results: 1978-1980 
 The midterm elections of 1978 and the presidential election of 1980 combined to suggest 
that the country had quickly had its fill with the turmoil of the Carter Presidency. A new kind of 
Republican Party was emerging, and a new degree of partisan polarization of both parties was 
beginning to dominate national politics. Persistent inflation and tepid economic growth had 
combined to give voters the very malaise that then-President Carter had hoped to alleviate. With 
Republican sweeps of the Presidency and Senate in 1980, the country’s policymaking and 
ideology had seemed to take a rightward turn. Was this in part caused by a decline trust in 
government? The 1978-1980 ANES data provide the first availability of the Panel data discussed 
in the previous section. Three distinct survey waves were conducted during this two year period. 
While respondents were asked every time about their political ideology, only once, during the 
second wave, were they asked about their level of trust in the federal government. Thus, to get an 
idea of what effect a respondent’s trust in government may have had on their changing political 
ideology, one would need to analyze the Trust response at wave 2, along with other explanatory 
variables, and the Change in Ideology between waves 2 and 3. Again, the other available 
explanatory variables in this election period were Prior Party Identification, Prior Ideological 
Identification, Interest in politics, Awareness of Public Affairs, Income, Education, Race/Ethnic 
category, and Gender.  
 As shown in Table 1 in Appendix A, a higher degree of distrust in the federal government 
did not suggest a higher degree of conservatism by 1980. Not only is the coefficient close to 
zero, but there is actually a 56% chance that the hypothesis that no relationship exists between 
Trust and Ideology could explain the coefficient, thus rendering it nowhere near statistically 
significant. If you had a low degree of interest (higher value in the Interest coding) in politics 
prior to 1980, you were likely to become more liberal, whereas if you were less aware of public 
affairs, you were likely to become more conservative by 1980. While a respondent’s level of 
education did not have a statistically significant relationship with their changing level of 
conservatism, higher incomes did suggest a very slight increase in conservatism. Perhaps 
surprisingly, being male was associated with a more liberal change in 1980, though more 
intuitively being African American also promoted liberal change.  
 Also in Table 1, when limited to ideological moderates (Those categorized as a 3, 4, or 5 
on the wave 2 version of the Ideology variable), no statistically significant relationship emerges 
between Trust and Ideology. The aforementioned effects of Interest and Awareness were 
enlarged and still marginally statistically significant, suggesting that ideological movement 
among moderates was amplified relative to the rest of the electorate. Still, even when looking at 
the most volatile and arguably significant members of the electorate, there was no evidence to 
support the thesis that distrust of government promoted conservatism in 1980, despite that year’s 
election serving as a conservative revolution of sorts. 
 For the 1980 election period, the topic of inflation was considered to be the most 
important political issue for voters, and a rather sophisticated policy question about inflation was 
chosen to see if those with greater distrust of the government would become more conservative 
(hawkish) on inflation (“Roper Center Public Opinion Archives”). More specifically, would 
those distrustful of the government increasingly think that the government should prioritize 
cutting inflation (reducing spending) over anti-poverty programs? This policy choice would later 
become a major fault line in the campaign, and the ANES phrased the question as a 1-7 scaled 
choice between having the government devote all of its attention to reducing inflation, at the 
expense of unemployment spending (1), and having the government devote all of its attention to 
reducing unemployment, at the expense of rising inflation (7). As Table 2 in Appendix A shows, 
the relationship between Trust and “Inflation” is nowhere close to being statistically significant. 
If you were male, highly educated, and conservative, you were more likely to think the 
government should focus on anti-inflationary policies (Evidenced by negative coefficients), but 
there was absolutely no support for the hypothesis that greater distrust of government would 
predict a more hawkish approach to inflation. Perhaps this measure of inflationary policy was too 
nuanced to get a good feel for attitudinal shifts, but other explanatory variables did have the 
expected effects on conservative opinions about inflation, so the result for Trust remains 
surprising. When limited to people who had moderate opinions about inflation, the Trust variable 
did not quite achieve statistical significance, and the coefficient actually went in the opposite 
direction of what was expected. Greater distrust actually promoted greater support of 




 The second available batch of ANES Panel data occurs in the 1990-1992 cycle. After an 
intervening twelve years of mostly conservative governance, was there a tendency of distrust in 
government to directly promote conservatism? In this series, the ANES introduced the critical 
topic of social/interpersonal trust to its Panel studies. Respondents were asked how often they 
could trust other people, generically. The scale was 1-5, with higher values again indicating 
lower trust in other people. The question gauging respondents’ interest in politics was not 
available, but the gauge of respondents’ awareness of public affairs was available. This batch of 
surveys produced a wealth of data, as several key explanatory variables were available in all 
three of the survey waves. Thus, I could analyze the effects of these variables on three different 
“Change” periods of Ideology – from wave 1 to wave 2, from wave 2 to wave 3, and from wave 
1 to wave 3. Other explanatory variables, such as demographic variables and the question 
relating to a respondent’s level of awareness of public affairs, were only asked in wave 1 (1990). 
For all three of these models, additional models analyzing only the ideological moderates were 
added. Table 2 of Appendix A offers a rather bewildering summary of the results, but I will 
highlight the major conclusions here.  
 When examined across the ideological spectrum and within moderates, once again Trust 
does not have the anticipated effects on Ideology. In the one case with clear statistical 
significance (Column 1) and one case with marginal statistical significance (Column 5), 
increased distrust actually suggests a slightly more liberal ideology, though this may be 
consistent with the earlier-hypothesized effects of foreign policy issue salience. Trust’s effect on 
changing conservatism among moderates was as expected (And nearly statistically significant) in 
the 1991-1992 interval, but this was the only instance of support for the paper’s hypothesis. The 
rest of the models show nothing approaching statistical significance or noteworthy coefficients. 
In terms of patterns across the data, Republican Party identification consistently suggests a more 
conservative change in ideology, which may speak to a partisan polarization of the electorate, 
including moderates, during this time. The less aware of public affairs the respondent was, the 
more likely he or she was to become more liberal, albeit slightly. Although the strength of the 
relationship was limited, higher incomes tended to increase the likelihood of becoming more 
conservative, especially in the 1991-1992 years of the surveys. Again, these trends emerged both 
with the broader ideological spectrum and with moderates by themselves. 
 However, as Table 2 of Appendix B shows, increased distrust of government was 
significantly associated with a sense of disapproval of the Persian Gulf War, considered then the 
most significant issue of the day, over time (“Roper Center Public Opinion Archives”). At all of 
the survey waves during this period, those who were more distrustful of the government were 
more likely to think the war was unsound policy. While this actually seems to challenge the 
distrust-conservatism thesis, recall that during times of foreign policy issue salience, the effects 
of distrust may actually work in the opposite ideological direction (Hetherington and Husser 
2011). Indeed, while being conservative made a respondent more likely to support the Gulf War, 
being distrustful of the government had the opposite effect. Liberalism and distrust actually had 
complimentary roles with regard to the Gulf War. Figure 1 below shows more graphically the 
changing probabilities of supporting the war at different levels of distrust. While vast majorities 
of people of all levels of trust supported the Gulf War during this period, a clear trend suggests 
that distrustful respondents were less likely than trustful respondents to support the war. Here, 
the hypothesis that distrust of the government encourages opposition to government action in the 
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Results: 2000-2002 
 The 2000-2002 ANES is a nice microcosm of the various dynamics of trust and ideology 
that this project deals with. While there were only two survey waves that contained all of the key 
explanatory variables, one occurred in a time when domestic policy issues were salient (2000), 
while the other wave occurred at a time when national security issues were most prevalent 
(2002). The attacks of September 11
th
 not only galvanized support for then-President George W. 
Bush; it also rejuvenated trust in the federal government, though this trust may have only been 
extended to national security and defense priorities. Thus, these surveys provided opportunities 
to test the central hypotheses presented earlier. Since there were only two waves of surveys that 
asked the studied questions, though, only one instance of Change in Ideology could be analyzed. 
Furthermore, the specific issue positions chosen for this election period were each only available 
once, so no changing attitudes on those issues could be studied. Finally, the variable that gauged 
respondents’ awareness of public affairs was no longer used by the ANES in this election period.  
 Interestingly, between 2000 and 2002, higher distrust of the federal government 
suggested a statistically significant conservative change in political ideology across the 
ideological spectrum, as illustrated in Table 3 in Appendix A. Since the attacks on the World 
Trade Center and Pentagon occurred near the end of this survey interval, one might expect the 
typical distrust-conservatism relationship to hold, but the timing of the re-contact survey in 2002 
should have occurred at a time when higher levels of trust in government would galvanize the 
public around the Administration and, perhaps, conservative leaders more broadly. Nevertheless, 
even in this time of increased Defense spending and national security posturing, those who were 
distrustful of the government in 2000 were more likely to become more conservative by 2002. 
Prior identification with the Republican Party less surprisingly suggested a more conservative 
ideological change during this time, while being male and Black was associated with more 
liberal ideological change. When the analysis is limited to ideological moderates, males are again 
more likely to become more liberal during the survey period, while those who distrusted their 
fellow citizens were more likely to become more conservative. Republican Party adherents in 
2000 were again more likely to become conservative, and if one expands one’s notion of 
statistical significance slightly, it is the case that higher distrust of government increases the 
likelihood of year 2000 moderates becoming more conservative. Thus, the initial hypothesis that 
distrust breeds conservatism is upheld despite the prevalence of national security issues and 
events during this survey period. 
 Even more confounding to prior theoretical approaches is the fact that, as shown in Table 
3 of Appendix B, low trust in government is not associated with calls for less federal education 
funding. During the 2000 election, education policy was consistently at the top of Americans’ 
priorities when evaluating the candidates, and while the federal government’s involvement in 
education has often been ideologically contentious, there was no statistically significant evidence 
that distrust of the government eroded support for federal involvement in education (“Roper 
Center Public Opinion Archives”). In fact, less interpersonal trust was actually associated with 
greater support of increased education funding, since higher values on the education funding 
variable corresponded with less support for education funding. On the foreign policy front, one’s 
level of trust in 2000 did not have any statistically significant relationship with one’s degree of 
support for the Iraq War in 2002, as shown in Table 4 of Appendix B. Amazingly enough, 
having low interpersonal trust in 2000 was associated with much higher support of the Iraq War 
in 2002, since once again low values of the “Iraq War Support” variable indicate higher support 
for the war. In all models of support for the Iraq War, Republican Party identification and prior 
conservative identification suggested much greater support for the war, while Black respondents 
were much less likely to support the war.  
 When one only examines the 2002 survey, at the height of buildup for the Iraq War, Trust 
seems to play a much greater role in cross-sectionally suggesting opposition to the war. As 
shown in the second column of Table 4 (Appendix B), those who expressed a distrust of the 
federal government in 2002 were much less likely to be supportive of the war, even though low 
interpersonal trust had the opposite effect during the same survey wave, thus suggesting that trust 
in government and interpersonal trust can have quite distinct attitudinal effects. Figure 2 below 
gives a stark graphical depiction of distrust’s effect on the probability of a respondent supporting 
the Iraq War. Whereas those who trust the government “Nearly all of the time” have a 60% 
chance of strongly supporting the war, those who trust the government “None of the time” have 
only a 40% chance of strongly supporting the war and are nearly as likely to strongly disapprove 
of the war. Here, then, is an instance of support for Hetherington and Husser (2011)’s thesis that 
in times of foreign policy issue salience, distrust of government will promote less typically 
conservative positions. This is especially true given that those who described themselves as 
ideologically conservative were much more likely to support the war. During the overall survey, 
though, when distrust of government did have an effect on ideological attitudes, it tended to 
promote conservatism, even in the face of foreign policy issue salience.     
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 Like the panel election data before it, the 2008-2010 ANES interviewed respondents 
during both Republican and Democratic administrations, thus offering the additional opportunity 
to test whether or not Trust’s effects on Ideology, if existent, were simply the product of partisan 
electoral outcomes. One key caveat for this data, however, is that the Trust question from 
previous surveys was in this panel data; instead the measure of respondents’ trust in government 
was the question, “How often does the federal government do what most Americans want?” 
Though subtly different from asking whether or not the government can be trusted to do what is 
right, when averaged out over the whole population, this question should tap into similar 
attitudes. After consulting with my advisor, Professor Ron Rapoport, this question was 
determined to be suitable as a proxy for Trust and was coded 1-4, with higher numbers indicating 
less trust/confidence in government. In one survey wave, the scale was expanded to 1-5 to 
include one value, 3, for the response of trusting the government to do what is right “Half the 
time.” The measure of interpersonal trust was also not included in this panel data, but a question 
relating to respondents’ sense of external political efficacy was for the first time asked. 
Respondents were asked to what degree they thought federal government officials “cared.” If 
people thought they were dealing with disinterested, apathetic government officials, they might 
come to want less of a role for those government officials in their daily lives. Thus, the variable 
Efficacy was entered into the ordered probit regression models. 
 The 2008-2010 ANES consisted of four separate survey waves – three during the initial 
2008-2009 period and one re-contact wave in 2010. Thus, three separate Change in Ideology 
variables could be generated from the data – from wave 1 to wave 3, from wave 1 to wave 2, and 
from wave 2 to wave 3. The re-contact survey in 2010 offered an opportunity to see if Trust 
exerted longer term effects on Ideology, so a fourth Change in Ideology variable measured the 
difference between the Ideology values at wave 4 and wave 1. Did greater distrust of government 
at wave 1 (2008) lead to a more conservative ideological change by wave 4 (Between 2008 and 
2010)? In total, eight ordered probit regression models are shown in Tables 4 and 5 of Appendix 
A; models of ideological change among only moderates were added to the analysis of each of the 
four survey waves.  
 Table 4 shows the three Change in Ideology (both generally and among moderates) 
models from 2008-2009, while Table 5 shows the results for the 2010 re-contact study. Distrust 
of the federal government was statistically significantly associated with ideological change 
among moderates in all of the models. Though distrust was associated with higher liberalism 
between the two 2009 survey waves, it was associated with a conservative change in the 
ideology of moderates in all the other models. Among the whole population, Trust had very 
small coefficients and was rarely statistically significantly related to conservative ideological 
change. In three of the four models of moderates, though, Trust did have the theorized effect on 
Ideology. Prior Republican Party identification consistently predicted conservative ideological 
change among moderates and the broader population, while Efficacy, Income, Education, Race, 
and Gender all had inconsistent, often statistically insignificant effects. Notably, in these models 
as well as the models from other election periods, a prior conservative ideological identification, 
when accounting for other variables, suggested strong tendencies toward becoming more liberal. 
Conversely, extreme conservatives were likely to become more liberal, all else being equal. 
Could it be that, in the absence of other conservatizing influences, ideological partisans were 
predisposed toward becoming more moderate? This point is discussed further in the Conclusion 
section. 
 Table 5 of Appendix B shows the logistic regression coefficients for Trust and other 
explanatory variables with regard to what were declared by the voters to be the two most 
pressing issues of the survey period: Healthcare and the Iraq War (“Roper Center Public Opinion 
Archives”). Logistic models were used for these issues because the dependent variables were 
both dichotomous; respondents either the supported the government’s efforts (0), or they 
disapproved (1). As with the ordered probit regression coefficients, the magnitude of these 
coefficients by themselves should not be overemphasized; their sign and statistical significance 
are more important for analytical purposes. As could be expected, healthcare was more important 
to respondents during the 2009 and 2010 survey waves, while the Iraq War was more salient in 
the initial 2008 wave. In both cases, greater distrust of government engendered opposition to 
government action in these policy areas. In the 2008 cross-sectional data regarding the Iraq War 
(Column 2), a one standard deviation increase in distrust of government (.694 on a 1-4 scale) 
made respondents 15% more likely to disapprove of the government’s handling of the Iraq War. 
In the 2009 cross-sectional data on healthcare, a one standard deviation increase in distrust of 
government (.675 on a 1-4 scale) made respondents 13% more likely to disapprove of President 
Obama’s efforts on the issue. Thus, if someone went from trusting the government “most of the 
time” to “some of the time,” they would tend to be 13% more likely to disapprove of President 
Obama’s healthcare agenda.          
 
 
Conclusion: Trust Matters, under the Right Circumstances 
 When taken together, these results may seem fairly uninspiring when considering the 
hypothesis that low trust in government breeds conservatism. Of the nine total models of 
ideological change among the whole population, distrust was only statistically significant and 
positively associated with increasing conservatism twice, once in 2008-2010 and again in 2000-
2002. Certainly these results don’t justify any claims that variations in trust in government can 
explain longer term ideological trends across the population. Among moderates, however, more 
intriguing results can be derived. In five of the nine models of changing ideology among 
moderates, coded as 3, 4, and 5 on the ANES Ideology scale, low trust in government made 
respondents slightly more likely to be conservative. This relationship existed nearly across the 
board in the 2008-2010 models and appeared intermittently in the 2000-2002 and 1990-1992 
survey periods. To the extent that ideological movement within the moderates of the American 
political spectrum influences election outcomes, any decline or increase in trust in government 
may still have significant political impacts. It is also clear from the data that Trust’s effect on 
Ideology among moderates is a recent and growing phenomenon, as it was nearly absent from 
the 1978-1980 and 1990-1992 survey periods. While it is not clear what the modern instrument 
for translating distrust of government into increased conservatism among moderates would be, 
the trend is likely worth considering for policymakers and legislators who want to design public 
policy that caters to the electoral center. 
 While distrust may frequently tug moderates to the Right (or to the Left when foreign 
policy issues are most salient), ideological extremists are consistently predisposed to becoming 
more moderate, holding all other variables constant. This is shown by the consistently negative 
coefficients generated for “Ideology_lagged” variables in the “Change in Ideology” models. 
Some of the magnitude of these coefficients is easily explicable. Extreme liberals, those coded as 
1, can only change in the conservative (higher) direction, whereas extreme conservatives, coded 
as 7, can only change in the liberal (lower) direction. Thus, the beginnings of a negative 
relationship between lagged ideology and ideological change are framed. However, cross-
tabulations and scatterplots indicated similar findings for less extreme conservatives and liberals. 
 What can be distilled from these opposing trends? On the one hand, during times of 
relative distrust of government, moderates are likely to move to one extreme or the other 
(Depending on the salient issues), though typically towards the conservative end in recent times. 
On the other hand, extreme conservatives and liberals are consistently likely to become more 
moderate. Can political ideology behave cyclically? This is a question far beyond the scope and 
quantitative backing of this study, but it is a question worth considering in future research on 
American political attitudes. At best, what this paper can contribute to this line of research is the 
idea that, when moderates do move away from the center, at least in recent times, distrust of the 
federal government is a contributing factor.   
 Owing to the very influential literature on the topic, this paper also wanted to test, using 
more recent data, whether or not variation in trust in government had ideological consequences 
for issues that were salient or important to voters at the time of the surveys. Through the four 
ANES survey periods, seven specific issues were chosen based on contemporaneous polling that 
showed them to be the most significant issues to voters at those times. The issues covered both 
domestic and international topics, and while it was often difficult to model the change in 
attitudes on these issues during each survey period, it was possible to model these attitudes with 
lagged independent variables such as Trust. When it came to approving of President Obama’s 
efforts on healthcare reform in 2008-2010, low levels of trust in government were associated 
with greater disapproval rates. Healthcare proved to be the only domestic issue that saw the 
expected results; low trust in government in the 1978-1980 surveys actually suggested less 
support for anti-inflationary policies. Additionally, low trust in government was not statistically 
significantly associated with less support for federal education spending, and only once did 
distrust seem to suggest less support for government intervention in the economy in 1990-1992. 
Internationally, however, low trust in government proved to be a strong and consistent basis for 
opposing both the Gulf and Iraq Wars. Across the categories of trust in government among the 
population, support for both these wars was quite high, but as respondents became less trusting 
of government, they were significantly less likely to support or approve of these wars. This 
finding seems to reinforce the related findings of Hetherington and Husser (2011) in that, when 
foreign policy/national security issues are dominant, any decline in trust in government may 
actually promote what we normally think of as liberalism. More generally, low trust in 
government seems to suggest, though inconsistently, less support for government activity in the 
salient issue areas of the day.  
 In the course of this rather quantitatively extensive study, other results may have 
incidentally proven to be significant for further study. Most interesting was the nature of the 
prior Party identification variable, which often suggested that those who earlier described 
themselves as Republicans were more likely to become more conservative than those who sided 
more with Democrats. If Republicans are more likely to become more conservative than non-
Republicans, is the oft-discussed ideological polarization of the Parties a continuing reality? This 
trend might also be countering the previously discussed possibility of ideological change 
behaving cyclically. To fully address the prior literature on trust in government, it also would 
have been optimal to have consistent questions on respondents’ trust in their incumbent elected 
officials to see if “thicker,” non-institutional trust were a stronger measure. 
 This paper investigated the once-unaddressed question of whether or not the decline in 
trust in government has had direct ideological impacts on the American political process. 
Importantly, this paper focused on the changing attitudes of the electorate, not the evolving 
policy preferences of nervous Democratic lawmakers (Hetherington 2005). While there was little 
to no support for the blunt hypothesis that low trust in government makes the electorate more 
conservative, there was moderate evidence for a scaled-down version of the hypothesis when 
limited to the changing attitudes of ideological moderates. The effect of trust in government on 
moderates’ ideologies also seems to be a recent and increasing phenomenon, which may provide 
an intriguing set of incentives for the Democratic and Republican Parties during each coming 
election cycle. There were also several issues, namely healthcare and national security policies, 
in which people who trusted the government less tended to oppose government involvement later 
on. This part of the analysis can be seen as a tepid affirmation of the idea that low trust in 
government makes the electorate more libertarian, not simply what Americans commonly term 
as “Conservative.”  
 Continued study is of course needed to see if the recent trends in ideological change, 
especially among moderates, continue to respond in part to changes in trust in government. If 
persistent budget deficits, congressional gridlock, and perceived corruption continue to depress 
people’s trust in government, will they simply turn away from the Party in power, or will they 
more gradually turn away from government? If the former is true, then the easy solution to the 
problem of distrust of government is to hold elections, which may functionally mean that distrust 
of government is not all that problematic. If the latter is true, however, it raises questions about 
whose political agenda is really harmed by the decline in trust in government, and it may raise 
even more important questions about who has the incentive to improve trust in government 
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Appendix A: Modeling Changes in General Political Ideology 
Table 1: Change in General Ideology in 1980 
-------------------------------------------- 
                   (1)               (2)    
          Ideological Change    Only for Moderates 
-------------------------------------------- 
Ideology_lagged    -0.39***        -0.50*** 
                  (-7.99)         (-5.40)    
Trust              -0.06           -0.08    
                  (-0.58)         (-0.55)    
Party               0.04 (p<.15)    0.04 (p<.15)    
                   (1.24)          (1.19)    
Interest           -0.25***        -0.32*** 
                  (-3.10)         (-3.32)    
Awareness           0.12*           0.21**   
                   (1.64)          (2.31)    
Education        -0.01             -0.01    
                  (-0.25)         (-0.18)    
Income            0.02**           0.02*    
                   (1.89)          (1.35)    
Male              -0.25**          -0.16    
                  (-1.94)         (-0.97)    
Black             -0.59***        -0.38 (p<.15)    
                  (-2.45)         (-1.17)    
Other             -0.36            -0.28    
                  (-0.65)         (-0.36)    
-------------------------------------------- 
N                     401             280    
-------------------------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (One-Tailed Tests) 
 
Table 2: Ideological Changes in 1990-1992 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                   (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)             (6)    
       Ideology 90-91     Only Moderates   Ideology 91-92    Only Moderates    Ideology 90-92    Only Moderates    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ideology_1990     -0.40***        -0.64***                                        -0.42***        -0.47*** 
                 (-11.08)         (-8.42)                                        (-12.14)         (-6.74)    
Trust_1990        -0.05*           0.01                                           -0.04 (p<.17)    0.01    
                  (-1.36)          (0.10)                                         (-0.95)          (0.22)    
Party_1990        0.10***          0.09***                                         0.12***         0.12*** 
                   (4.36)          (3.43)                                          (5.32)          (4.71)    
Awareness_1990    -0.07*          -0.12**          -0.02            0.02           -0.06*          -0.08*    
                  (-1.42)         (-1.94)         (-0.23)          (0.13)         (-1.30)         (-1.59)    
Income_1990       -0.01            0.01            0.02*            0.04**         0.02**           0.01*    
                  (-0.12)          (0.38)          (1.44)          (1.85)          (2.23)          (1.46)    
Education_1990    -0.03 (p<.15)   -0.06**         -0.14***         -0.21***       -0.10***        -0.10***  
                  (-1.12)         (-1.70)         (-2.45)         (-2.78)         (-3.57)         (-3.16)    
Male              -0.07           -0.06            0.24 (p<.15)     0.39**         -0.03           0.07    
                  (-0.79)         (-0.56)          (1.24)          (1.73)         (-0.36)          (0.66)    
Black_1990         0.11            0.31*          -0.13           -0.44(p<.15)     -0.18 (p<.15)  -0.22(p<.15)    
                   (0.70)          (1.47)         (-0.38)         (-1.05)         (-1.25)          (-1.21)    
Other_1990         0.26            0.16           -0.80*          -0.61            -0.26 (p<.15)  -0.55**   
                   (0.95)          (0.50)         (-1.27)         (-0.77)         (-1.07)         (-2.01)    
Ideology_1991                                      -0.59***       -0.78***                                 
                                                  (-8.60)         (-4.55)                                    
Trust_1991                                         0.019           0.09 (p<.16)                                    
                                                   (0.26)          (0.93)                                    
Socialtrust_1991                                  -0.06            -0.11 
                                                  (-0.32)         (-0.45) 
Party_1991                                         0.21***         0.18***                                 
                                                   (4.46)          (2.97)                                    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
N                     659             436             528             349             732             508    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (One-Tailed Tests) 
Table 3 (Appendix A): Attitudinal Predictors of Ideological Change (2000-2002) 
------------------------------------------- 
                      (1)              (2)    
            ∆ in Ideology 2000-2002   Only Moderates    
-------------------------------------------- 
Ideology_2000      -0.42***        -0.33*** 
                  (-9.44)         (-3.39)    
Trust_2000          0.14**          0.11 (p<.16)    
                   (1.66)          (1.02)    
Social Trust_2000   0.06            0.18*    
                   (0.56)          (1.29)    
Party_2000          0.17***         0.14*** 
                   (5.77)          (3.69)    
Interest_2000       0.02            0.04    
                   (0.43)          (0.53)    
Education_2000     -0.03            0.02    
                  (-0.89)          (0.34)    
Income              0.01            0.01    
                   (0.20)          (0.22)    
Male_2000          -0.13 (p<.15)   -0.18*    
                  (-1.20)         (-1.30)    
Black_2000         -0.24 (p<.15)   -0.01    
                  (-1.10)         (-0.03)    
Other_2000         -0.16           -0.08    
                  (-0.78)         (-0.35)    
Hispanic_2000       0.06           0.05    
                   (0.28)         (0.19)    
-------------------------------------------- 
N                     522             292    
-------------------------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses 











Table 4 (Appendix A): Models of Change in Ideology 2008-2009 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                      (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)             (6)    
           Ideology 08-08 Moderates 08-08    Ideology 08-09    Moderates 08-09  Ideology 09-09  Moderates 09-09    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Trust_2008         0.04             0.12*           0.05 (p<.16)    0.19***                                   
                   (0.71)          (1.59)          (1.00)          (2.53)                                    
Ideology_2008      -0.37***        -0.15**        -0.36***         -0.11*                                    
                 (-15.69)         (-2.16)        (-15.68)         (-1.46)                                    
Party_2008         0.24***         0.18***         0.26***         0.21***                                 
                  (12.47)          (6.26)         (13.17)          (7.24)                                    
Interest_2008      0.02            0.01           -0.01            0.04                                    
                   (0.77)          (0.29)         (-0.02)         (0.81)                                    
Efficacy_2008      0.01            0.02           -0.01           -0.07 (p<.15)                                    
                   (0.00)          (0.41)         (-0.12)         (-1.18)                                    
Income            0.01             0.01           -0.01           -0.01 (p<.15)   -0.01**          -0.01    
                   (0.80)          (0.17)         (-0.32)         (-1.08)         (-2.27)         (-0.88)    
Education         -0.02   2        0.03           -0.04*           0.02           -0.07***         -0.07**   
                  (-0.58)          (0.64)         (-1.29)          (0.38)         (-2.92)         (-1.98)    
Male               0.06            0.05            0.06            0.08            0.08**           0.05    
                   (0.96)          (0.56)          (0.86)          (0.80)          (1.65)          (0.76)    
Black              0.12           -0.16            0.03            -0.18           0.14*            0.18*    
                   (0.96)         (-0.94)          (0.20)         (-1.02)          (1.60)          (1.50)    
Hispanic          -0.01           -0.02           -0.07            -0.07           -0.12 (p<.15)   -0.16    
                  (-0.08)         (-0.07)         (-0.50)         (-0.30)         (-1.13)         (-0.94)    
Other              -0.11           -0.17          -0.33**          -0.57***       -0.33***        -0.48***  
                  (-0.66)         (-0.74)         (-1.94)         (-2.37)         (-2.72)         (-2.65)    
Trust_2009                                                                        -0.06*          -0.11**    
                                                                                  (-1.49)         (-1.78)    
Ideology_2009                                                                      -0.30***        -0.12**   
                                                                                 (-17.61)         (-2.17)    
Party_2009                                                                         0.20***          0.15*** 
                                                                                  (13.59)          (6.83)    
Interest_2009                                                                     -0.03 (p<.15)    -0.04    
                                                                                  (-1.17)         (-1.01)    
Efficacy_2009                                                                     -0.02            -0.04    
                                                                                  (-0.74)         (-0.98)    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
N                    1233             515            1218             504            2362             943    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (One-Tailed Tests) 
 
Table 5 (Appendix A): Models of Ideological Change at 2010 Re-contact Survey 
-------------------------------------------- 
                      (1)             (2)    
             Ideology_Change    Moderates Only    
-------------------------------------------- 
Ideology_2008     -0.38***         -0.04    
                 (-12.95)         (-0.39)    
Trust_2008         0.01            0.13*    
                  (0.06)          (1.33)    
Party_2008         0.26***         0.21*** 
                  (10.76)         (5.73)    
Interest_2008      -0.06*          -0.05    
                  (-1.38)         (-0.82)    
Efficacy_2008      0.11**          0.07    
                   (2.26)          (0.94)    
Income             0.01             0.01    
                   (0.24)          (0.21)    
Education         -0.07**          -0.06    
                  (-1.75)         (-0.96)    
Male              -0.04            -0.01    
                  (-0.56)         (-0.02)    
Black             -0.01            -0.38*    
                  (-0.03)         (-1.61)    
Hispanic           0.04            -0.06    
                  (0.19)         (-0.17)    
Other             -0.06            -0.71**   
                  (-0.29)         (-2.31)    
-------------------------------------------- 
N                   771             310    
-------------------------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses 





Appendix B: Trust’s Effect on Salient Issues at the Time of the 
Chosen Election Survey Periods 
Table 1 (Appendix B): Change in Opinions on Inflation in 1980 
-------------------------------------------- 
                      (1)             (2)    
  Change in Inflation Opinion    Just Moderates    
-------------------------------------------- 
Inflation_lagged   -0.60***        -0.74*** 
                 (-11.63)         (-6.11)    
Trust              -0.06            0.04    
                  (-0.46)          (0.27)    
Ideology_lagged    -0.14***        -0.14**    
                  (-2.56)         (-1.78)    
Party              -0.01           -0.01    
                  (-0.05)         (-0.18)    
Interest           0.04            -0.07    
                   (0.45)         (-0.55)    
Awareness          0.02             0.02    
                   (0.22)          (0.20)    
Education         -0.05*          -0.08**    
                  (-1.55)         (-1.84)    
Income            0.01             0.01    
                  (0.82)          (0.85)    
Male              -0.21*          -0.23*    
                  (-1.47)         (-1.26)    
Black              0.04            0.48*    
                   (0.18)          (1.32)    
Other              0.26            0.35    
                   (0.33)          (0.44)    
------------------------------------------- 
N                   296             191    
-------------------------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (One-Tailed Tests) 
 
Table 2 (Appendix B): Changing Support for Gulf War 
---------------------------- 
                      (1)    
      Gulf War Support 90-92    
---------------------------- 
Gulfwarsupport_1990 -0.75*** 
                   (-14.01)    
Trust_1990          0.11**   
                   (2.01)    
Ideology_1990      -0.12***  
                  (-2.79)    
Party_1990         -0.09***  
                  (-3.18)    
Awareness_1990      0.06    
                   (0.99)    
Income_1990        -0.01    
                  (-0.29)    
Education_1990     0.04 (p<.15)    
                  (1.22)    
 
Male              -0.16*    
                  (-1.45)    
Black_1990         0.29**    
                  (1.79)    
Other_1990        -0.36    
                  (-0.99)    
---------------------------- 
N                     808    
---------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (One-Tailed Tests) 
 
Table 3 (Appendix B): Effects on Support for Education Funding (Positive correlations indicate 
associations with less support for education funding) 
---------------------------- 
                      (1)    
Support of School Funding_2000 
---------------------------- 
Ideology_2000        0.11***   
                   (2.56)    
Trust_2000         -0.02    
                  (-0.30)    
Social Trust_2000  -0.14*    
                  (-1.30)    
Party_2000         0.11*** 
                  (3.76)    
Interest_2000     -0.09*    
                  (-1.55)    
Education_2000    -0.02    
                  (-0.51)    
Income_2000       0.01    
                  (0.89)    
Male_2000         0.25***   
                  (2.33)    
Black            -0.25 (p<.15)    
                  (-1.05)    
Other             0.09    
                  (0.44)    
Hispanic         -0.23    
                 (-0.93)    
---------------------------- 
N                     782    
---------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (One-Tailed Tests) 
 
Table 4 (Appendix B): Attitudinal Effects on Support for Iraq War  
-------------------------------------------- 
                      (1)             (2)    
                   2000-2002      Year 2002    
-------------------------------------------- 
Ideology_2000      -0.11**                   
                  (-2.28)                    
Trust_2000          0.02                    
                   (0.19)                    
Social Trust_2000  -0.37***                  
                  (-3.03)                    
Party_2000         -0.20***                 
                  (-5.95)                    
Interest_2000      -0.05                    
                  (-0.86)                    
Education_2000      0.20***                 
                   (4.88)                    
Income             -0.01           -0.01    
                  (-0.65)         (-0.52)    
Male_2000          -0.23**                    
                  (-1.96)                    
Black               0.32*           0.40**    
                   (1.35)          (1.73)    
Other               0.17           -0.05    
                   (0.73)         (-0.24)    
Hispanic            0.01           -0.54    
                   (0.00)         (-1.82)    
Ideology_2002                      -0.17*** 
                                  (-3.89)    
Trust_2002                          0.16**    
                                   (1.71)    
Social Trust_2002                  -0.33***  
                                  (-2.77)    
Party_2002                         -0.15*** 
                                  (-4.75)    
Interest_2002                      -0.01    
                                  (-0.06)    
Education_2002                      0.15*** 
                                   (3.85)    
Male_2002                          -0.14 (p<.15)    
                                  (-1.15)    
-------------------------------------------- 
N                     493             510    
-------------------------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (One-Tailed Tests) 
 
Table 5 (Appendix B): Logistic models of Issue Positions in 2008-2009: (1) Approval of President 
Obama’s Handling of Healthcare and (2) Approval of the Iraq War 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
                      (1)             (2)    
             Obama_health approval Iraq War Approval    
--------------------------------------------                                         
Ideology_2009       0.31***                 
                   (7.40)                    
Trust_2009          0.18**                    
                   (1.75)                    
Party_2009          0.24***                 
                   (7.14)                    
Interest_2009      -0.36***                 
                  (-5.99)                    
Efficacy_2009       0.34***                 
                   (4.29)                    
Income              0.01           -0.01    
                   (0.44)         (-0.83)    
Education          0.01            0.25*** 
                   (0.12)          (3.41)    
Male               0.09           -0.07    
                   (0.86)         (-0.47)    
Black              -1.39***        0.66**   
                  (-3.64)          (1.99)    
Hispanic           -0.18           0.61**    
                  (-0.64)          (1.84)    
Other              -0.92***        1.83*** 
                  (-2.44)          (3.94)    
Ideology_2008                      -0.31*** 
                                   (-6.44)    
Trust_2008                          0.20**    
                                   (1.81)    
Party_2008                         -0.50*** 
                                  (-11.97)    
Interest_2008                      -0.16**   
                                  (-2.26)    
Efficacy_2008                       0.09    
                                   (1.01)    
_cons              -4.51***         2.53*** 
                  (-9.72)          (4.64)    
-------------------------------------------- 
N                    2247            1358    
-------------------------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (One-Tailed Tests)  
  
